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FART I INTRODUCTION
CHAPTER I.
DELIMITATION OF SUBJECT
Introduction This thesis is essentially a study
of the Secondary Reserve Account and the Bond Investiaent
Account of United States commercial banks, during the period
from 1929 to 1946. The terms "all commercial banks" and
"insured commercial banks" will be used interchangably as
insured commercial banks equal about 94% of all commercial
banks. In turn, all comiaercial banks constitute about 97%
i/
of all banks m the United States.
There will be several interesting by-paths down which
relatively cursory glances will be taken, while hewing to
the main line of the thesis. As an example of this, mention
should be made of the problem of determining the relative
size of a bank's secondary reserve account. This is a most
fascinating topic and worthy of extensive consideration;
however, no such consideration will be attempted here,
although this aspect of bank management will be treated
adequately for the purpose at hand.
1/ Board of Governors of
Federal Reserve Bulletin
,
2/ Infra, p. 13
the Federal Reserve System,
33:172, February, 1947.
-1-

statement of the Problem , There are three main
problems which the thesis presents and endeavours to answer.
They are:
1. The more or less mechanical problem of ascertain-
ing what actually were the component parts of commercial
banks* secondary reserve accounts and bond investment
accounts for the period under consideration.
2. The more important problem of showing how these
two accounts have been changing in character and the reasons
therefor. In other words, it will be necessary to discover
something of the various influences which caused those
responsible for secondary reserve and bond investment
policies to makie their decisions.
3« The problem of indicating what the future holds
for commercial banks, especially with regard to the assets
comprising the secondary reserve and bond investment accounts,
respectively.

CHAPTJiK II
THE RESERVE ACCOUOTS
The Three Reserve Accounts . A bank generally has
three reserve accounts, or from another viewpoint, its
reserve account is divided into three sections. These are
respectively, the primary reserve account, the secondary
reserve account, and the bond investment account. These
latter two are combined into one account by some banks.
By the term, "reserve", is meant, essentially, a
reserve against deposits. These reserve accounts will be
considered in order.
I. THE PRII\iAHY RESERVE
Composition of Primary Reserve . The primary reserve
consists of cash in the bank*s own vault, reserve (legal and
excess) with the Federal Reserve Bank, and the item "Due from
Other Banks" or the balances at correspondent institutions,
A drain on the primary reserve may result from;
1. Customers withdrawing deposits in cash.
2. Customers writing checks which are deposited in
other banks.
3. A bank paying for its investments, supolies, etc.,
1/
by drawing on primary reserves.
1/ Russell D. Kilbourne and George W. Woodworth,
Principles of Money and Banking . New York and London:
McGraw Hill Company, Inc., 1937, p. 296

II . THE , SECONDARY RESERVE
Aspects of Secondary Reserve , The secondary reserve
account will be discussed under the four headings of
Function, Composition, Size, and Specific Component Parts,
1. Function . The most satisfactory way of defining a
secondary reserve account is by a definition of its function.
The reason is that there is general agreement among bankers
as to the essential function of this account, whereas,
various opinions exist relative to its composition.
The function of the secondary reserve account may be
defined as follows:
The object of the secondary reserve is to replenish
the primary reserve, due to seasonal reductions in
deposit volumes, extraordinary withdrawals, or to make
additional funds available for seasonal increases in
local loans. 1/
In addition, it is vital to note that the liquidation
and conversion of the secondary reserve account, for purposes
of replenishing the primary reserve, should be accomplished
without appreciable loss. Finally, and most important, the
attributes to be sought in this account are safety, liquidity,
2/
and yield, in that order.
2. Composition . A consideration of the composition of
secondary reserves leads into more troubled waters, Plowever,
T7 H. N. Stronck, "Eligible for Secondary Reserve",
ijnerican Bankers Association Journal
, 24:449, J"anuary, 1932,
2/ Paul Moody Atkins, Bank Bond Investment and Secondary
Reserve Management
,
Boston, New York: The Bankers Publishing
Company, 1940, p, 263

a sure guiding beacon is the definition given under the
heading, "Function". Thus, a selection of the "tools", or
component parts of the secondary reserve should be made on
the basis of the ends to be attained. V/hile this method is
of material assistance, there are many complex considerations
involved in selecting the constituent parts of the secondary
reserve accounts.
Even though safety and liquidity are of prime
importance, the banker cannot neglect the following in
determining Composition:
a. Earning power or yield.
b. Interest rate
0. Maturity
d. Economic forces and political forces.
Before discussing, individually, the above four items,
it is necessary to point out that they are applicable, in
varying degrees, to both the secondary reserve account and
the bond investment account. More specifically, earning power
or yield, and interest rate, are closely interwoven with any
consideration of the bond investment account; maturity and
economic forces are vital in treating the secondary reserve
account.
a. Earning Power . The banker is naturally interested
in the earning power or yield returning to the bank from the
use of employed funds. Indeed, this is a gross understatement

6earning power or yield on loans and investments is the
cornerstone of tlie banking business, and no bank can long
exist which does not pay sufficient attention to this fact.
It has been noted that yield is more pertinent to
the bond investment account than to the secondary reserve
account. This is because of the underlying characteristics
of the two accounts, with safety and liquidity being the
prime requisites of the secondary reserve and safety and
yield the chief concerns of the investment account. However,
the amount of yield will influence the qualitative and
quantitative selection of assets for both accounts. For
instance, if call loan rates are too low, or such loans are
restricted, something else should be found for secondary
1/
reserve investment. Again, the assets in the bond investment
account do not necessarily have to be bonds—in 1928 and 1929,
2/
call loan rates were &p to 9fo, This fact certainly could not
be ignored in favor of following some set formula, with
regard to selection of component assets.
Thus, the banker must be cognizant of call loan rates,
of commercial paper rates, of rediscount rates at the Federal
Reserve Bank, of business conditions, and, above all, of
bond prices and coupon rates. Furthermore, as none of the
1/ M. Plin Beebe, "Reserves V/e Call Secondary",
American Bankers Association Journal, 22:1066, May. 1930.
2/ Atkins, op. cit., p. 275.

above are liable to be static, for more than a brief period
of time, so, also, the banker's viewpoint cannot be static,
but must be conscious of trends in all things that affect the
reserve accounts. This point cannot be over-emphasized,
espedially in these days, when, due to low money rates, the
banker must seize every opportunity to secure a return on
his loans and investments.
b. Interest Rate . The interest rate is closely
connected with the subject of yield. In the case of call
loans, commercial paper and banker's acceptances, the connec-
tion is obvious, as the interest rate is the yield. But,
with the securities held in the bond investment account and
in the secondary reserve, the relationship is more complex.
Interest rates on newly-issued bonds will reflect the pre-
vailing conditions in the money market, and the prices of
previously issued bonds will vary, accordingly, to reflect
this new yield condition.
It can be seen that the ability to liquidate without
appreciable loss, a greatly desired quality of the reserve
accounts, is placed in jeopardy by this offsetting fluctua-
tion of bond prices and interest rates.
There are two distinct types of risks which a bank
must assume when it purchases bonds. The first is the
risk that the credit standing of the obligor will weaken
due to general economic conditions, conditions within its
industry, or conditions within the company. The second
risk is that which comes from changes in interest rates
causing, as it does, changes in /Eond/ prices ,1/
1/ tT. Harvie Wilkinson, Investment Policies for Commercial
Banks , New York and London: Harper and Brothers, 1938, p,14S

The bond investment policy with regard to interest
rates has been well-stated as follows:
At a time when interest rates are falling, it is
desirable to purchase long-term bonds in order to take
advantage of the resulting capital increment. When
the interest rate starts to increase, long term bonds
should be sold and short term assets acquired in order
to avoid the inevitable decline in the capital value.
By a skillful handling of the investment account, it
can be made to add appreciably to the earning power of
a bank. 1/
In the case of interest rates, even more so than with
other banking problems, a knowledge of the present situation
is not sufficient. Interest rate trends must be studied,
and an understanding of probable trends evolved. The
question naturally arises as to what causes interest rates
to change. The interest rate is the price of money and will
fluctuate with the demand for and supply of funds. The most
important causative factor on the supply side is excess bank
reserves. The Michigan Banker's Association Study Conference
has set forth the following for consideration:
. . . the supply of funds available for employment by
banks is. . .an important factor. . .in determining the level
and fluctuations in short-term interest rates.
1. A dollar of bank reserves supports several dollars
of bank deposits, and, therefore, the supply of funds
available for loans is very potent. /This statement is
denied by some financial authoritiesTZ
T7 Paul M. Atkins, "Safe Ways to Keep Up Earnings",
American Bankers Association Journal
, 22:954, April, 1930.

92. Grold movements, the ebb and flow of currency in
circulation, changes in Federal Reserve policy, all contribute
to comparatively wide and sometimes erratic fluctuations in
the supply of reserves,
3. When it becomes necessary for member banks to
borrow from the Reserve bank, the cost of such borrowing is
a factor which naturally causes them to raise the cost of
credit to their customers. When excess reserves exist,
competition among the banks for the available loans quite
naturally forces money rates downward.
The Association Study Conference goes on to discuss
factors affecting long-term interest rates. Further on, it
will be seen what these influences were in the 1929-1946
period. It is sufficient for the present to summarize by
saying that interest rates, as an integral part of yield,
play a quantitative and qualitative role in the selection of
items for the secondary reserve account, and especially, for
the bond investment account,
c. Maturity . The dividing line between the secondary
reserve account and the bond investment account may be
summed up in the single word, "maturity". For maturity not
only helps to determine precisely what assets will be
included within each account, but also further sub-divides at
1// Murray Shields, "The Outlook for Interest Rates",
Bond Investment Policies for Banks , Ann Arbor, Michigan:
University of Michigan, School of Business Administration,
Bureau of Business Research, 193B, p. 30
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least one of the included assets, namely, bonds* Securities
in the secondary reserve portfolio must not have maturities
in excess of four years and from this the conclusion is
drawn that medium and long-term United States Government
securities and other securities are ineligible for the
1/
portfolio.
The reason why maturity has such importance is because
of its intimate relationship with liquidity. For present
purposes, liquidity means that the bonds are readily market-
able, under practically all conditions, with but a relatively
2/
small loss in price.
llilhen the primary reserve is subjected to pressure, due
to the withdrawal of deposits, funds from the secondary
reserve replenish the primary reserve. Thus, it is good
banking practice to have a secondary reserve well-diversified
as to maturity, so that the forced sale of secondary reserve
assets as a means of replenishing the primary reserve will be
obviated. It is important to note that mere shortness of
maturity is not of itself a sign that a particular security
would be eligible for the secondary reserve. An even spacing
11
of maturities throughout the designated period is desirable.
T7 Wilkinson, op. cit., p. 17.
2j Clearinghouse Section, American Bankers Association,
Secondary Reserves and Security Buying, V.3. Comoiercial Bank
Management
, 13 vols. New York; American Bankers Association,
1932, p. 4.
^ Wilkinson,^ op. cit., p. 17 »

Maturity must be considered in relation to the
overall composition of the secondary reserve and also in
relation to the fluctuations of deposits in the individual
bank.
In a similar manner, maturity is of importance in the
bond account as a means of maintaining an adequate secondary
reserve. It must be realized that the three reserve accounts
are not independent of one another; on the contrary, they
are very interdependent upon one another. Thus, a marked
reduction in the amount of primary reserve available would
necessitate the liquidation and conversion of a portion of
the secondary reserve into primary reserve. This nexus
extends through the three accounts, so that a change in one
of them would result in some change in the others.
In order to better visualize the relative positions
of the three accounts, it may be helpful to employ the
following analogy: The three reserve accounts are drawn up
in battle array against the "enemy", deposits. The primary
reserve is the first line of defense, the secondary reserve
and the investment account are the second and third lines of
defense, respectively.
Finally, it should always be remembered that
The more distant the maturity of a bond, the more
its price is affected by a change in the interest rate
level. Hence, if interest rates begin to harden, it
is quite possible for the market price of these bonds

12
to drop materially in a very short time,
d. Economic Forces and Political Forces . This is the last
problem in the discussion of the composition of the secondary
reserve. This particular facet will be enunciated more in
detail, later, in showing the changing character of com-
mercial banks* secondary reserves from 1929 to 1946.
The term "economic forces" is, admittedly, quite broad*
An example will serve as the best means of illustrating
economic forces.
If business conditions are poor, there will be little
commercial paper in circulation. Also, banter »s acceptances
will decline in volunie. There will be less demand for call
loans. There will be fewer security issues for possible
inclusion within the bond investment account.
At all times, whether conditions are good or poor,
there will be a variance in interest rates among the various
items comprising the secondary reserve. The banker must be
constantly on the alert; good judgement is always necessary,
both in selecting the particular items and in deciding the
amount of each to include.
In the political sphere, the United States Grovernment,
through its policies, may complicate the situation. In the
depression years of the thirties, an "easy money" policy was
1/ Atkins, Bank Bond Investment and Secondary Reserve
Management
, p. 267.
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advocated. This certainly caused the banker more than
momentary concern, as he could see his opportunities for
earnings evaporate. Again, during both World V/ars, the
Government was vitally concerned with the successful prosec-
ution of its War Bond sales. There was great moral suasion
and encouragement on the part of the United States Treasury
for the banks to aid in financing the war effort by the
purchase of these bonds. Again, in the 1930s, the Government *i
i
gold-buying program resulted in a large increase in bank
reserves. This had an important effect on money rates.
From these few examples, it is seen that the banker
must take a very pertinent interest in economic forces and
political forces. Indeed, in its all-embracing meaning,
economic forces include yield and interest rate and maturity
which were discussed above.
3. Size . Without attempting to evade the question, it
can be fairly stated that no absolute answer can be given, as
to the size of the secondary reserve account. However, a
definite and workable solution presents itself.
The chief determinant of the size of the secondary
reserve account is the nature of the deposits. Other factors
which may be considered are (1) the size and condition of the
bank's capital account, (2) the condition of the loan and
discount portfolio (a portfolio of liquid commercial loans
would obviate a smaller secondary reserve) and (3) the
position of the business cycle (in times of prosperity it is

a good idea to build up the secondary reserve account in
anticipation of probable recessions or depressions),
A consideration of the nature of deposits is actually
a study of deposit fluctuations.
Since the major objective of the secondary reserve
is to provide cash funds for the primary reserve and
since the principal reason why cash is required is
either to pay off deposits as they are withdrawn or to
build up the legal reserve and working balances in the
event that the volume of deposits increases, it is
evident that the stability of deposits and the rapidity
of their fluctuations is a major determinant of both
the size and composition of the secondary reserve. 2/
The first step in the endeavour to ascertain stability
is to divide the deposits into demand and time deposits. The
reason for this is obvious, as demand deposits are subject
to check, v/hereas time deposits represent savings, for the
most part. The bank can refuse immediate payment on time
deposits, unless it receives a 30-60 day written notice,
though banks would naturally be reluctant to exact this*
Demand deposits are the backbone of everyday business
life. They are increased or withdrawn without notice, at
the discretion of the depositor. The bank must be on the
alert, at all times, to provide a capable defense against
the movements of demand deposits, much more so than against
time deposits.
1/ V>/ilkinson, op, cit., p. 28.
2/ Atkins, op, cit,, p. 258
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Fluctuations in the deposits may occur for a nuiaber
of reasons. ±^ayroll withdrawals and seasonal fluctuations
(due to the activities of local merchants) are two that
immediately come to mind. It would be impractical, however,
to adjust the secondary reserve for every fluctuation in
deposits.
It is desirable to have the secondary reserve
increase and decrease with variations in deposits
—
but it is not feasible to modify the size of the
secondary reserve by relatively small amounts.
It is usually sufficient to compute the standard
amount of the secondary reserve every six months on
the basis of the deposits averaged over the preceding
twelve months. 1/
The deposit account should be analyzed to note whether
there is a Sxnall number of large accounts or a large number
of small accounts, or whether some in-between position is
maintained. Ihe past experience of the individual bank will
play a prominent part in this analysis. The bank with chiefly
a small number of large deposits might be in a much more
vulnerable position than the others, because the activity of
just one depositor would effect a marked change in both
deposits &nd reserves.
A distinction should be drawn between the large city
bank and the smaller country bank in connection with this
1/ Haul r/i. Atkins, "The Relation of Deposits to Secondary
Reserves", The Bankers r.Iagazine
, 121:478, October, 1930.

question of size, ivlucii of the city bank's business is
relatively impersonal; as a result, it may be difficult to
forecast all appreciable deposit fluctuations. However,
a city bank, because of its size, has an element of safety
that the country bank lacks. It would take a concerted
fluctuation to seriously disturb the deposit and reserve
position of a city bank.
The position of the country bank is the reverse.
Because of its knowledge of local industrial and agricultural
conditions, the bank can foresee payroll and seasonal
fluctuations. However, such a bank, especially if it has a
number of large depositors, must be on the alert to combat
a sharp reduction in the primary reserve account, and,
consequently, in the secondary reserve account.
Hence, the size of the secondary reserve must vary
according to the individual bank's needs, and these needs
will be conditioned by the bank's size and location.
Finally, mention should be made of a rule-of-thumb
standard concerning size, which is quite prevalent, although
certainly not to be followed, blindly;
Some authorities recommend a secondary reserve of
35% of the demand deposits and lO^o of the time deposits;
however, for general purposes, if a bank will keep a
secondary reserve equal to 20% of total assets, it will
be following conservative practice. 1/
1/ Clearinghouse Section, American Bankers Association,
op. cit., p. 3.

Total assets in this sense means all earning assets, i. e.,
all loans and investments,
4. The Specific Component Parts of the Secondary Reserve .
The tasic remains to set forth the specific component
parts of the secondary reserve. Heretofore, the secondary
reserve has been considered through its Function, Composition
and Size, respectively. All three of these will assist
in deciding exactly what should be placed in the account.
The component parts will vary from time to time as
seen in the foregoing discussion of the points deserving of
study, when deciding upon the composition of the secondary
reserve. Therefore, the best approach is to present an
all-inclusive list of items that might attain a position in
the secondary reserve account, under various conditions*
1/
The list follows:
A, Non-local loans and discounts.
1, Bankers acceptances,
2, Commercial paper,
3, Call loans,
B. United States Government Securities.
1. Bills.
2. Notes.
3. Bonds,
4. Government guaranteed notes and bonds,
T7 Atkins, Bank Bond Investment and Secondary Reserve
Management
, p , 266
.
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C. state and municipal bonds, notes, and
warrants
•
D. Corporate bonds and notes*
1. Railroads.
2. Public Utility.
3. Industrial.
4. Miscellaneous.
It should be remembered that the medium-term and
long-term securities in the foregoing list comprise the
assets found in the bond investment account. As maturity
draws near, they are transferred to the secondary reserve.
This temporal division line is generally four years,
A narrower view of the secondary reserve account than
the one Just offered, is afforded by some authorities.
1/Ir. R. C. Effinger, "Vice-President of the Irving Trust Co.,
New York City, says, "Nothing belongs in the secondary
reserve account but high grade securities maturing within
1/
two years, bankers acceptances, and prime commercial paper."
A striking point is brought forth by these remarks.
Mr. Effinger is speaking in a contemporary sense, i. e., as
a responsible bank official in the year, 1946. Today, the
inclusion of only these three items in the secondary reserve
has much to commend it. The brevity of maturity on securities
1/ R. C. Effinger, "Government Bond Portfolio Management",
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle, 163: 3475 .June 27,1946.
•
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indicates a recognition that interest rates may rise from
their present low status, thus depreciating bond prices.
The absence of call loans shows cognizance of the low rate
of return to the banker on these loans, today. All-in-all,
Mr. Effinger's remarks reflect a well-warranted apprehension
concerning the future of money rates.
A standard compilation of secondary reserve assets,
as found in recognized textbooks on Banking would include:
United States securities, bankers acceptances,
commercial paper eligible for rediscount at the Reserve
Banks, call loans and readily marketable municipal, state,
or corporate obligations of relatively short maturity.!/
However, the constant flux of conditions affecting
the banking industry makes concrete and specific any general
discussion of secondary reserve assets. Surely, Mr, ii;ffinger's
remarks would appear strange, unless viewed in the light of
these aforesaid changing economic and political conditions.
Still, it is legitimate to enumerate those assets,
which as a general rule may find a proper position in the
secondary reserve. Keeping in mind that any thought of
yield must follow after safety and liquidity, the list follows:
1. Call loans
2. Commercial paper
3. Bankers acceptances
XT Russell D. Kilbourne and George Vv. Woodworth,
Principles of Money and Banking , New York and London:
McGraw Hill Book Co., Inc., 1957, p» 230
Cf: Major B. Foster, editor. Money and Banking , Third Edition,
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1947, p. 265
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4. U, S. Government bills
5« U. S. Grovernment notes
6. U. S. Government bonds maturing
within four years
It will be noted that these items are non-local in
character.
It /Is/not wise to include local loans and discounts
eligible for rediscount with a Federal Reserve bank as
a part of the secondary reserve, because a bank: does not
have complete discretion in regard to them as it does
concerning non-local earning assets. On the other hand,
the possession of a substantial portfolio of eligible
loans can reasonably affect the size of the secondary
reserve by mailing it possible to have the reserve small
and still have it safer than would otherwise be the case.l/
This seeming dilemna can be solved by banks confining
themselves to "loans to concerns of a high national credit
2/
rating." A well-managed portfolio of local loans may prove
to be a very liquid asset, besides returning an appreciable
income; hence, the desire to place as much of employable
funds as possible in this form.
The distribution of secondary reserve assets, or the
proportion of each asset to be held, in relation to the
secondary reserve account as a whole, is another vital
question. The distribution will vary according to yield, and
economic and political forces. For purposes of illustrating
1/ Atkins, Bank Bond Investment and Secondary Reserve
Management
, p. 259.
2/ H. N. Stroinck, "Eligible for Secondary Reserve",
American Bankers Association Journal
, 24:449, January, 1932.

what the phrase "distribution of secondary reserve" con-
1/
notates, this schedule is offered:
1. Call money, conmiercial, and bankers acceptances 30fo
2. U. S. Government securities 30^^
3. State and municipal bonds 10%
4. Good bonds, listed, active, and of short
maturity, consisting principally of railroad equip-
ment trust and public utility issues 30%
100^
III. THE BOND IIWESTMENT ACCOUNT
Function, The bond investment account's main function
!
is to employ, profitably, those funds whiicha^e not needed for :
making local loans or for use in the primary reserve and
secondary reserve. The investment account has a definite
relation to the deposits of a bank, this connection extending
through the primary reserve and secondary reserve. The
amount of funds available for the investment account will
vary according to the demands made upon the other two accounts
by depositors.
The funds employed in bond investments are those that
can be tied up for a longer period of time than those
employed in the secondary reserve account. An appropriate
dividing line may be made by saying that the securities in
1/ Clearinghouse Section, American Bankers Association,
op • cit
. , p . 4

the investment account should have maturity dates in excess
1/
of four years. The banker does not expect to have to
liquidate his bond account, quicicly. It represents much
more of an income-producing source, rather than a means of
protection against a sudden and excessive withdrawal of
deposits. However, safety is more important than yield,
and although, liquidity may be sacrificed for yield, safety
may not be sacrificed for yield. Only high-grade securities
may be included within the investment account.
Size . The size of this account cannot be precisely
determined, as far as setting down rules is concerned.
However, the factors which affect the size of the investment
2/
account are determinable:
1. The nature of deposits.
2. The size and nature of the loan account.
3. The amount invested in banking premises and other
real estate.
4. The size and condition of the capital account.
Thus, the investment account is a residual account.
But, the management of the bond investment account is far
from being a haphazard affair* A definite program of
investment must be set up and followed, at the same time
allowing the investment manager some elasticity of judgement.
1/ Willcinson,op. cit., p. 30
2/ loc. cit.

Special attention must be given to diversification and
rotation of maturities.
Eligible Assets . The management of the bond invest-
ment account has had increasing importance in bank practice.
This is due to the trend of commercial banking practice away
from loan and discount functions to investment functions*
This will be seen more clearly in the succeeding pages,
i^or the present, it is sufficient to say that only specially
trained individuals should handle a present-day bond invest-
ment account.
The following assets are eligible for inclusion in
the bond investment account:
1. U. S. Governraent bonds.
2. State and municipal bonds, notes, and warrants,
3. Corporate obligations,
a. Railroad
b. Public Utility
c. Industrial
d. i^^iscellaneous
4. Foreign government—national, state, provincial,
municipal—obligations

PART II THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE SECONDARY
RESERVE ACCOiJNT AND BOND INVESTivlENT ACCOUNT
AND THE REASONS THEREFOR, 1929 - 1946
CHAPTER III.
GENERAL TRENDS IN TPIE SECONDARY RESERVE
AND BOND INYESTivIENT ACCOUNTS
Introduction . The preceding section has described
the secondary reserve account, and the bond investment account.
The function, composition, and size of these accounts were
explained and a list of the various assets coiaprising the
secondary reserve account was presented. The relationship
of the secondary reserve to deposits was developed and the
importance of earning power in connection with the account,
and, particularly with the bond investment portfolio was
stressed. It remains nov^r to consider the composition and
changing character of the secondary reserve and bond invest-
ment account, respectively, and the reasons underlying this
change, from 1929 to 1946. Through an appreciation of the
general principles concerning these account, presented in
Part I, it will be relatively easy to gain an insight into
the banker's mind as he faced the problems that confronted
him, and which still confront him.
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Widespread Nature of Trends . It is important to
note that the trends in the composition of the secondary
reserve were, at all times, typical for the country as a
whole. It is agreed that there were minor differences,
inasmuch as New jingland banks, in an industrial area would
differ in their reserve account composition, at any given
time, from the reserve accounts of banks in, say, Kansas.
For an example of this difference, Kansas member banks would
naturally grant more agricultural loans and carry less open
market paper than would member banks of the First Federal
1/
Reserve District.
However, this thesis is not concerned with such
specific differences in the composition of the secondary
reserve. Actually, the banker in Maine and the one in
California, or in any other part of the United States, was
faced with the same broad, vital, and engrossing problems.
Any difference in the account because of a bank's geographi-
cal location was simply one of degree.
The ii^nd of an hjro. . The 1929 stock market crash and
the business depression which ensued marked the end of an
era in banking history. However, the line of demarcation
between the old era and the new was not a sharp one. A
1/ Board of (governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Banking and lylonetary Statistics
,
V/ashington, D. C:
National Capitol Press, iM^ovember, 1943, pp. 692, 872.

gradual forced change in banking theory had been taking
place even in the booming 20s,
Historically, a coMaercial bank's main task had been
to grant short-term loans to local business concerns. An
adequate return on these loans was available, to the extent
that the banker's interest in other sources of income was
nominal. The bond investment account was not known as such
and the amount of funds placed in securities was small com-
pared witja the amount employed in local loans. The secondary
reserve account was a term with a vague and indefinite
meaning; even its function was open to disagreement. However,
the 1920s saw a change in the traditional banking viewpoint.
The change was expressed in a relatively greater expansion
in investments and collateral loans than in commercial loans.
The chief reason for this was the growing wealth of
large corporations in the united iitates. The huge surpluses
of these companies were very often retained for expansion-
istic programs. The necessity for bank funds was obviated.
Furthermore, many corporations financed themselves more and
1/
more by the issuance of securities.
The banks were thus placed in the position of having
to find an outlet for their now unemployed funds, funds that
had heretofore been absorbed in the comiaercial life of the
nation. The media chosen were investments and, to a lesser
1/ Glenn G, jiunn, "New rroblems of Investing Bank Funds",
The Bankers jLvIagazine
, 118:17, January, 1929.

degree, collateral loans. The collateral loan, however,
was circumscribed by the period of the 1920s and its
importance disappeared with the collapse of the security
market in 1929.
The Trend Toward Investments . The trend toward
investments came about slowly with impetus provided by Vvorld
V/ar I, when the banks helped finance the v7ar by the purchase
1/
of large quantities of (j-overnment bonds. This trend toward
investments, and especially Government issues, continued
during the 1930s and through World y/ar II, unabated. The
result was that on June 29, 1946, all insured commercial
banks in the united States held, roughly, ^,^82 billion of
investments, and about ^l'^ billion of this was in United
States Government issues. The reasons for this situation
and a more detailed analysis of it will follow, later.
However, it should be clear frora the outset that the com-
mercial bank shift from a loan and discount agency to an
investment agency has been and is the all-important banking
problem.
Naturally, the secondary reserve acconnt and the bond
portfolio account were profoundly affected. It will be seen
how other items in the secondary reserve account, such as
1/ John W. Tuthill, Management of Bank Investments in
i^lassachusetts
,
Boston: Northeastern University ruolicaticn,
1940, p. 11.

commercial paper, fluctuated during the 1929-1946 period,
but the vital question was the domination of the reserve
accounts by U. S. Goyernaient security issues.
Before discussing the reasons for the changing charac-
1
ter of the secondary reserve and the bond investment account,
it should be noted that the new developments were not desired
by the banking profession. Economic and political events
forced bankers to seek new outlets for their funds. The
commercial banker was reluctant to change his mode of
operations, and in some cases did so belatedly, to his sorrow.
The question of whether the shift from commercial
loans to investment media is permanent remains with us. Much
has been written concerning the problem and much more will
yet appear, for its importance can hardly be exaggerated.
For a closer examination of the motivating forces
underlying the 1929-1946 era, it is best to divide it into
two periods, the first extending from 1929 to 1939, and the
second from 1939 to 1946,

CHAPTilit IV.
TH^: PilKIOD FROM 1929 - 1939
I. Economic Factors
Business Depression . The most prominent economic
force in this period was the depression which ensued through-
out the 1930s, especially in the early 1930s. Despite
temporary recoveries, no real alleviation v;as felt until the
advent of a foreign war caused a boom in the domestic
economy of the United States. In its early stages, following
after the collapse of the stock market and in the years
immediately following, the depression was the most extensive
1/
ever recorded. The volume of bank credit outstanding, both
as measured by total deposits and by total loans and invest-
ments fell rapidly.
It was only logical that commercial paper and banker's
acceptances, respectively, should experience severe diminu-
tion as components of a bank's secondary reserve Dortfolio.
Despite an occasional upward spurt, the trend in comiriercial
paper and in bankers' acceptances was continually downward,
in the long-term aspect.
T7 Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Seventeenth Annual
Report of the Federal Reserve Bank of Boston , Boston; 1931 , p . 5
.
2/ Roy A. Foulke, "Better Days for Commercial Paper",
Banking
, 29:26, March, 1937.
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The great shrinkages which have taken place since
1923 in the volume of commercial credit created directly
through loans obtained from banks by customers have been
paralleled by reductions in the volumes of commercial
paper created independently of bank loans.l/
The average for commercial paper in 1923 was |;835 million
and from that year the trend was steadily downward, reaching
less than flOO million for 1934, and recovering only to a
point slightly below 5iii300 million for 1937 •
In 1923 the average outstandings of bank acceptances
were about ^525 million dollars, and they increased steadily
to a peak of #1,500 million in 1930. After 1930, they
steadily decreased dropping to about ^365 million for 1937.
In October 193B, total acceptances outstanding were
2/
$270 million and commercial paper #213 million.
The effect of the depression was accentuated for
two reasons:
1. Its severity.
2. The fact that it was combined with other economic
and political factors, which were occurring at the
same time.
It is true that in any depression commercial paper
and bankers* acceptance holdings will decline in volume;
also, the demand for funds will be low. This is a consequence
XT Research Council, American Bankers Association,
The Earning Power of Banks
, New York: Research Council,
American Bankers Association, 1939, p. 43*
2/ loc. cit.

3L
of the fluctuations of the business cycle. However, the
depression of the 1930s had a more-than-ordinary effect on
the banking system.
Retention of Funds by Business Concerns
Corporate Financing. A trend away from banks as a
source of capital funds had been evident in the 1920s, and
it continued during the 1930s.
The volume of loans was reduced because the larger
corporations no longer needed them as much as formerly
in order to carry on their activities, due to the fact
that they had obtained permanent funds from other
sources. 1/
Moreover, during the 1920s, especially, many business
consolidations had taken place, and very often the resultant
large business enterprise was able to finance itself, whereas
the individual companies which comprised the new large
business enterprise, had heretofore been obliged to seek
bank funds.
The larger corporations preferred to finance them-
selves either by issuing securities or by using the large
2/
surpluses acquired during the years of prosperity.
Within the last five /T924-19297years, . . .
corporations have become vastly enriched. Large
corporative surpluses have been amassed, as a
result of continuing prosperity and accompanying
huge profits, of which from 35%-407c> have been
retained and not disbursed as dividends
.^7
1/ Atkins, Bank Bond Investment and Secondary Reserve
Management, p. 3«
2/ Research Oouncil, American Bankers Association,
The Earning Power of Banks, p. 43
3/ Glenn. Munn, "New^Problems of Investing Bank Funds",
The Bankers Magazine, 118:17, January , 1929
.
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Technical changes in industry likewise had their
influence on the demand for loans from banks. These
technical changes took the form of:
1. Increased rapidity of freight transportation,
2. A speeding up of the manufacturing processes and
the use of continuous processes.
3. The large scale development of hand-to-mouth
buying in industry and trade.
The result of this was a reduction in the necessity
of large inventories and a shortening of the time for which
loans were required. The need for bank credit was lessened.
Influx of Gold . The influx of gold into the United
States resulted in a substantial increase of banic reserves.
The monetary gold stock of the United States stood at
|12,7 billion at the end of 1937 and it rose to almost
|15 billion in December, 1938. This was a result of the
gold-b-uying policy of the Government and also the flight of
capital from foreign countries, due to the threat of war.
' As a consequence, the excess reserves of Federal
Reserve member banks increased from #775 million in August,
1937, to |1.5 billion in December, 1937 o Then, in April,
193B, reserve requirements were reduced as a part of the
Government pump-priming business recovery program, and an
1/ Atkins, op, cit., p. 3,

11
accelerated expansion of excess reserves was set in motion,
Tlie action of April increased the reserves of that month
to $2,5 billion and by July 1938, they passed the $3 billion
mark. The theory appeared to be that, although there were
already vast unused supplies of credit available, the
creation of more supplies would tempt industry and trade
into programs of expansion.
The influx of gold and increase in bank reserves
was closely tied to two other factors
r
1. Low interest rates—the large supply of loanable
funds represented by excess bank reserves operated
on the supply side to keep interest rates low«
2. Bank earnings—low money prices on all types of
loans, accompanied at the same time, by low security
yields, caused a critical reduction in bank earnings.
Bank Earnings , Bank earnings dropped markedly during
the 1929-1939 period.
The earning power of the commercial bank dollar
in 1937 was less than half what it was in 1929. A
weighted index of approximate yield on the earning
assets of the banks, constructed by the /American
Banker »¥7Association*s Economic Policy Commission,
giving effect to the varying returns on and quantities
of the different classes of loans and investments
held by them, indicates that in 1929 the composite
earning rate was about 5.76 per cent. Computed on an
annual basis this rate shows an almost unbroken down-
ward trend from 1929 to 1939. For 1937, it stood at
2.80 per cent. This was about the sarfle as for 1936,
1/ Research Council, American Bankers Association,
op, clt., p, 22,

Data for the first eight months of 1938 show no
material change in this situation. 1/
The banks had funds, but the normal channels of
employment for said funds were unable to absorb them.
Thus, the banks turned to other, lower income-producing
sourcew, namely, investment media. Loans shrank relative
to investments and within investments, corporate issues were
largely replaced by United States Grovernment bonds. It is
important to note that the commercial banks suffered
relatively greater shrinkages in the more lucrative types
of their earning assets (commercial loans, call loans to
brokers and dealers, commercial paper and bankers* accep-
tances) than in those yielding smaller returns (Treasury
notes and certificates, and U. S. Government bonds).
Government Bonds , 1931 saw the period of Government
deficit financing, and huge Government borrowings from the
capital market, begin. From 1932 to 1937 there was a total
2/
of 424 issues for the creation of new debt. Thus, Federal
Government issues totaled nearly four times the domestic
corporate issues.
As of March 5, 1934, all member banks of the Federal
Keserve System were reported as having about 56 per cent of
their secondary reserve in government bonds. The banks
1/ Research Council, American Bankers Association
op. cit., p. 20.
2/ ibid., p. 45,

actually were financing the Government and the Government
was using this method in lieu of increasing taxation or
inflation through a depreciated dollar.
The Federal Reserve System supported the Government
financing program through its open-market operations,
while the member banks eagerly grasped the low-yielding
Government issues in the absence of the usual volume of
state, municipal, and corporate securities of the better
1/
type.
This trend continued and on june 30, 1939, 41 per cent
of the total direct and guaranteed obligations of the U. S.
Government were held by the commercial and savings banks,
and on iJecember 30, 1939, nearly 25 per cent of the total
assets of insured commercial banks were invested in the
2/
direct and guaranteed obligations of the U". S. Government.
II. Political Factors
Government Attitude on Interest Rates . Along with
the Government deficit financing, there occurred a definite
Government attitude and policy on interest rates. This was
the so-called "easy money" policy and was an integral part
of the Government's pump-priming measures. The Government's
effective control of interest rates and yields on Government
T7 Herbert Spero, "Is There A Bank Investment Policy",
The Bankers Iviagazine
, 127:665, December, 1933.
2/ J. Franklin Ebersole, "Protecting Bank Bond Investments",
Harvard Business Review
, 18:411, Summer, 1940.

issues had a pronounced effect on the rest of the domestic
security market and yields were low on all types of securities
Government Lending Agencies . A further source of
irritation to the banks was competition provided by Govern-
ment lending agencies, subsidized by the Government. No
generalizations can be made with regard to the effect that
the competition of these agencies had on the banks. That
there was competition is undeniable and an important aspect
was that by granting loans at very low rates, the Government
agencies forced the regular commercial banks to do likewise,
thus adding another headache to the earnings problem.
In summary, this first division of the 1929-1946
period, namely, the years 1929-1939, has indicated the
reasons for the initial change in the secondary reserve
account and the bond investment account. The second division
of this period will show how the changed character of the
secondary reserve and bond investment account was streng-
thened and solidified by the events of World War II.

TCHAPTER V.
THE PERIOD FROM 1940 - 1946
I. THE V/AR PERIOD
Improved Business Activity « The pre-war preparations
of 1940 and 1941 saw a continuance, at an accelerated pace,
of domestic activity* Commercial and industrial loans of
insured commercial banks increased from ^5.5 billion at the
end of 1938, to ^9.2 billion at the end of 1941. Total
loans, over the same period rose from billion to
^21.3 billion.
However, during the war period proper, commercial and
industrial loans declined somewhat, in volume. The amount of
commercial paper held by the commercial banks rose moderately,
while the volume of bankers' acceptances was at a standstill,
due, chiefly, to the lack of export-import trade. Call loans
to brokers and dealers, for purchasing or carrying securities,
increased markedly in 1944 and 1945 reaching a figure slightly
in excess of ^3 billion on December 31, 1945.
Bank Earnings
.
Earnings of banks advanced, during the
war period. However, it is significant that the improved
earnings of commercial banks cannot be attributed, mainly,
to the expansion in commercial and industrial loans. During
1942, 1943 and 1944, the comiiiiercial and industrial loans
figure was around ^7«8 billion per year. This was an increase
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over the #5 .5 billion of 193B, but it was not comniensarate
with the increase in industrial production.
Thus, the improved earning position of the banks
cannot be attributed to one, but rather to several factors:
1. The use of idle funds for purchasing Government
securities. The yield, though small, enabled the
banl£s to employ these hitherto unused funds.
2. The increase in comtaercial and industrial loans.
3. Profits on securities end recoveries. This was
an important item and was chiefly responsible for
the rise in earnings in 1945, as profits on securities
and recoveries rose from :^362 million in 1944 to
$509 million in 1945, for all insured commercial banks.
Net profits after taxes for insured commercial banks
rose from ^638 million in 1943 to ^906 million in 1945.
1946 will show a decrease in this figure to approximately
|800 million. The causes of this are high taxes, increased
operating expenses, reduced profits on securities sold, and
1/
large charge-off s and low recoveries. These causes will
remain prominent and a further slight downward tendency in
bank earnings seems most probable.
Hence, despite the increased earnings occasioned by
1/ Federal i-ieserve Bank of Boston, "Recent Trends in
Banking and i?inance", i^Ionthly Heview
, 29:8, February, 1947.

war-time activity, the pre-war problem of maintaining bank
earnings has returned. The ability of the commercial banks
to maintain adequate earnings through the practice of
traditional commercial banking functions was materially
restricted by economic and political happenings of the 1930s
and this restriction has left a permanent imprint on the
commercial banking system,
Q-overnment financing . The war years saw a tremendous
expansion in bank holdings of United States Government
securities. Banks were motivated both by patriotic reasons
and by the fact that other investment media were lacking.
Moreover, the banks were able to pay for their Government
obligations by the creation of V/ar Loan Deposits, against
which it was unnecessary to maintain legal reserves.
All commercial banks held a total of ^21,7S8 million
of Government securities on ijecember 31, 1941. t)n Jecember
31, 1945, v90,6l3 million was held by these same banks.
This figure was approximately 73;o of total loans and
1/
investments.
It is interesting to note how the Federal Reserve
System operated to maintain low yields on Government secur-
ities during this period. The Government was naturally
1/ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve bystem.
Federal Reserve Bulletin
, 33:172, February, 1947.

interested in borrowing money for the war effort, as cheaply
as possible. Following Pearl Harbor and the entrance of
the United States into the War, forces were released which
normally would have brought a reversal in the trend of
interest rates and a decline in bond prices, .vloney in
circulation increased rapidly, demand for credit expanded,
bank: deposits rose and gold moved out of the country. Excess
reserves of Federal Reserve member banks declined. However,
these forces were nullified by the actions of the Federal
Reserve bystem. These actions took the form of discount and
open-market operations.
The Federal pLeserve Banks would make loans to member
banks at 1/2 of l>o (the so-called preferential rate")
against short-term Governments, and also stood ready to
purchase all Treasury bills offered in the market at 3/8 of
1%, These policies resulted in effectively pegging short-
term interest rates at a very low level. Control of the
rates of interest on certificates, notes, and longer term
securities was achieved by the buying and selling operations
of the Reserve Banks. The effect of this policy was not
confined to Government issues, but spread throughout the
entire list of high-grade corporate bonds.

II. THE POST-Vi/AR PERIOD
Business Activity , The end of hostilities witnessed
a renewed burst of business activity. Borrowing for recon-
version and other purposes resulted in commercial and
industrial loans increasing about f2,0 billion during the
last six months of 1945 • The rate of increase slowed down
substantially during the first half of 1946, when commercial
and industrial loans of insured commercial banks increased
by about $75 million, but turned sharply upward beginning
about the middle of 1946.
This phenomenal increase in commercial borrowing
is the result of a variety of factors. Part of the
increase is probably an aftermath of the protracted
strikes in the first half of the year which contributed
to relatively unprofitable operations and resulted in
a depletion of working capital in a number of instances. 1/
Governoient Financing . The large-scale retirement of
Government securities was the principal influence on money
2/
and banking conditions in this period. For the first time
in many years, the Treasury raised no new money through
offerings of marketable securities. The national debt was
reduced over ^19 billion. This was effected out of the
Treasury's cash balance from the proceeds of the Victory Loan
at the close of 1945*
1/ Economics Department, Bankers Trust Company, New York.
Outlook for Bank Earnings. 1946-194B , New York: Bankers Trust
Company, September 3, 194o, p. 17.
2/ Information on post-war Government financing is taken
7rom: Bankers Trust Co., New York, U. S. Government Securities
and the Ivloney Market
,
New York: January, 1947, PP» 3-13. '_

Marketable issues maturing or callable in 1946
aggregated $70.4 billion. Of these ,three -months Treasury
bills in the amount of $17 -0 billion were consistently
"rolled over" as they fell due and, hence were not affected
by the retirement program. The remaining ^|53.4 billion
consisted, mainly, of certificates of indebtedness and
Treasury notes, as only $2.4 billion of bonds became due or
callable in the year.
The period of substantial debt retirement appears
to have come to an end with the end of 1946. The #3»5 billion
in the Treasury *s general fund is probably not far above the
minimum needed as a working balance. Any further significant
reduction in the debt must come from an excess of current
receipts over expenditures. This is a dubious prospect, due
to the unsettled European situation, which may require further
military expenditures, and thus wipe out the thin plus margin
of |)2.5 billion, which is expected by the Administration.
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TABLE I
MARKETABLE UNITED STATES GOVERNlvEENT DEBT
BY CALL OR MATURITY, DECEiVJBER 31, 1946
(Amounts in billions of dollars)
Type of Issue ing Dec.
31. 1946 5 yrs.
^ Over
1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 5 yrs
Treasury bills 17.0 17.0 17.0 — — -
Certificates 30.0 30.0 30.0 — —
Treasury notes 10.1 10.1 6.3 3.7
Treasury bonds
Bank-eligible
Bank-ineligible
69.9
49.6
37.4 1.5 6.4 6.7 10.7 12.0 32.5
49.^
Total marketable
debt 176.6 94.5 54.8 10.1 6.7 10.7 12.0 82.1
* This column added by the author of this thesis.
T7 Bankers Trust Company, New York, United States Government
Securities and the Money Market
, p. 9.

If the Treasury continues its present practice of
converting into certificates all maturing or callable issues
not redeemed in casJi, the reduction of the short-term debt
achieved in 1946 will soon be undone. Treasury notes will
disappear from the debt and the supply of bank- eligible bonds
will constantly dwindle. (See Table I)
Continuation of the present debt management policy
would result in the accumulation of an ever larger portion
of the Federal debt in the form of short-term securities and
might increase the amount held by the banking system. The
commercial banks would be strongly tempted to reach out for
higher yields and to dispose of their excessive short-term
holdings to the Federal Reserve banks, particularly if the
latter continue to support short-term rates at present levels.
This, together with the growing dearth of bank-eligible
Treasury bonds, might lead to strong downward pressure on the
yields, not only of such eligible issues, but eventually of
all intermediate and long-term issues. In other words, there
is a distinct possibility of a renewed wave of declining
interest rates.
In summary, the Treasury's debt retirement policy
during 1946, led to an important decline in the security
holdings of commercial banks. However, this retirement policy
has run its course, for all practical purposes, and the fact

must be faced that a permanent change has taken place in
the banking system. A perpetual Cjovernment debt of at least
200 billion dollars (approximately) is a certainty. The
banking system is a fiscal agent for the Q. S. Government.
Commercial banks, alone, carry ^5 billion of Government
securities. An immediate reduction in this figure by banks
disposing of their securities would result in a disastrous
drop in Government bond prices, furthermore, the possibility
exists that the Government may demand that each commercial
bank maintain a certain percentage of its bond portfolio
account in Government issues.
Long-term Loans and Installment Loans . Before dis-
cussing the future of the secondary reserve account, and
the bond investment account, notice should be taken of two
fairly recent developments in commercial banking practice,
long-term loans and personal installment cash loans, res-
pectively.
Term loans resulted chiefly through the efforts of
banks to find good earning assets, in light of the very low
yield on securities and the sluggish market for industrial
and commercial loans. A secondary factor, which helped to
spawn term loans was the practice of the banks to make war
production loans, many of which matured in more than one
year. The term loan is, typically, a fairly large loan made
to a sizable business corporation and has been designed by

the banks to meet the changing financial needs of such
enterprises.
Of late, however, banks have been extremely wary of
these loans, as many of them were used for inventory
financing. Inventories are now swollen almost beyond recog-
nition and banks are rightly timorous of the effect that a
price drop would have on its ability to recoup these loans.
The increase in personal installment cash loans is
a direct result of commercial bank attempts to break into
a lucrative field hitherto dominated by small loan companies.
All commercial bank holdings of this type of loan increased
1/
from #347 million in 1939 to |;552 million in 1946.
Automobile, repair and modernization, and other
types of retail installment loans, are also very important
for the commercial banks, although these three categories of
consumer installment credit have not increased as much
percentage-wise, since 1939, as has the personal installment
cash loan.
Both commercial long-term loans and installment credit
loans will play an important part in commercial bank opera-
tions in the future.
1/ Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
"Consumer Installment Credits of Commercial Banks, By Type
of Credit", Federal Keserve Bulletin, 33:203, February, 1947.

PAHT III THE FU'iURE CHAHACT2R OF THE SECONDAEY RESERVE
ACCOUNT AND THE BOND INVESTivLENT ACCOUNT
CHAPTER VI*
THE FACTORS DETERI'JINING THE FUTURE COivIPOSITION
OF THE TWO ACCOUNTS
Thus far, it has been seen how a change came about
in the cominercial banking function—what that change was and
the reason for it. 'ihe secondary reserve account and the
bond investment account, respectively, were vitally affected,
as the secondary reserve account became composed mainly of
short-term Covernment securities, while the bond investment
account was dominated by longer term Government issues. The
assets customarily found in the secondary reserve and the
diversified selection of securities usually present in the
bond investment accoant were either greatly diminished in
volume or totally absent. The importance of the bank
earning problem has been stressed and its relation to the
secondary reserve accoant and, especially, the bond investment
account has been indicated.
It remains now to consider what the future holds for
commercial banks, especially their secondary reserve and bond
investment accounts.
In any attempt to forecast what the composition of
these accounts will be, it is first necessary to consider the
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forces which will have an important influence in deciding
this composition. These forces are:
I. Business activity
II. interest rates
III. Bank earnings
I. BUSINESS ACTIVITY
Indications of Business Activity . As mentioned above,
the post-war period saw a sharp rise in business activity.
The Federal reserve Board industrial production index rose
from 163 in L'ecember 1945 to 182 in November 1946. Commer-
cial loans, including open-market paper, rose from v7i920
million on December 30, 1944, to ig>10,334 million on June 29,
1946, for insured commercial banks. Bankers* acceptances
outstanding rose from '4IO7 million in November 1945 to #169
3/
million in December, 1946. However, loans to brokers and
dealers, for purchasing or carrying securities, slumped from
|i3,l64 million on December 31, 1945, to ijj)2,417 million on
June 29, 1946 (for all insured commercial banks). This
was due to the stringent margin requirements imposed by the
Federal rceserve Board.
1/ Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Indexes of Business",
Monthly jieview of Credit and Business Conditions
, 29:19,
February, 1947.
2/ Federal Reserve Bulletin , 33:174, February, 1947.
2/ ibid., 33:180
4/ ibid,, 33:174

Limiting Factors to Conmierclal and Industrial Loan
Expansion
.
Hence, improved business activity has
enabled the commercial banks to again utilize their normal
credit functions, at least, to some extent. But, there are
limiting factors to a further expansion of commercial and
industrial loans:
Price Adjustments. V/hile a long-term period of
prosperity will occur in the next few years, a time of price
adjustment downward must take place in the immediate future,
Vi/hether this will be a sharp or a gradual adjustment is
debatable. However, the recent gains in bank loans to
business reflect the sharp upswing in prices, and the
necessity of borrowing to carry inventories at these prices.
Thus, a downward trend in prices, accompanied by the fact
that business concerns are becoming increasingly wary of large
inventories, will go to halt an increase in commercial loans.
Corporate Financing . Substantial demand for funds by
business developed in the period of transition from industrial
operations for war to peacetime business activities. Although
the financial position of many business enterprises was
greatly strengthened during the war, resort to external
sources of financing was frequent after the closing phases of
the conflict.
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To some extent, outside financing /bank loans/iias
been heavier than originally planned as a result of a
tendency of inanagenient to maintain a strong cash position
owing to unbalanced inventories and labor disputes,
while at the same time the postwar expansion plans
of many business concerns grew more ambitious and the
increased values placed on goods and services in the
market necessitated a larger amount of funds to transact
the same physical volume of business. 1/
However, in the future, more and more business
financing will take the form of security issues, with the
present-day prevailing low interest rates serving as a spur
to this mode of financing business.
Corporate financing increased considerably during
1945 and 1946. New issues (for both new capital and refundingj
increased from ^3,112 million in 1944 to ^6,li.20 million at
the end of 1946.
Most of the direct wartime influences on the corporate i
capital market were ended with the completion of the Treasury'!}
war financing program, successfully concluded with the Victory
Loan, the relaxation of production controls after V-J day,
and the removal of the excess profits tax effective January 1,
1946. Some of the changed conditions under which the new
issue market has been operating, since the beginning of the
year and their effects upon the volume and types of securities
1/ Federal Reserve Bank of New York, "Earnings and Expenses
of the Second District iVlember Banks", ...lonthly Review of Credit
and Business Conditions
, 28:78, September, 1946.
2/ Federal Reserve Bulletin, 33:182, I'ebruary, 1947.

1/
likely to be offered are set forth below:
1. Vvartiine restraints on the flotation of securities
for the purpose of expanding plant equipment and working
capital have been removed, itestrictions on the availability
of equipment and shortage of raw materials for non-war
industries was effective in limiting the volume of corporation
financing through new capital issues. The removal of these
indirect restraints has cleared the way for an increased
volume of new capital investments*
2. The completion of the Treasury's war financing
program,which employed the mechanism of V/ar Loan drives,
during wnlch time corpoPcLte security financing was largely
suspended, signalized the restoration of more even conditions
in the corporate new issue market, as corporate flotations
need no longer be concentrated in between-drive months.
3. The elimination of the excess-profits tax has
removed a powerful incentive for issuing refunding securities,
although it remains to some extent, for those corporations
with fiscal years other than calendar years, since excess
profits taxes are still payable on that portion of net
income falling within the calendar year, 1945
•
Small Business
. l/Vhile large business firms will
1/ Federal Reserve Bank of Kew York, "New Corporate Financing
Monthly Review of Credit and Business Conditions
,
28:31,
April, 1946.
pnc^TON UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF LIBERAL ARTS
LIBRARY

finance themselves with security issues, thus neglecting
bank funds, the smaller business concern, which does not
issue securities, will also demand less bank, credit, simply
because the level of business activity is already very high.
An important point to remember here is that the savings
accumulated by the small average consumer during the war
years have been rapidly dissipated in the post-war period.
Consumer expenditures have exceeded consumer incomes. Hence,
consumer demand has lessened.
The Liquid Position of Corporations . Even though the
working capital position of many concerns was impaired by
post-war expenditures, thus necessitating the use of bank
credit, business corporations as a group are still in an
extremely liquid position. It is true that these liquid
1/
assets are not evenly distributed, but many corporations
can finance thecaselves solely on the basis of current
resources.
Summary , In summary, commercial banks will not regain
their former position as loan and discount agents; the trend
first indicated in the 1920s will continue in the future, and
commercial banks will be greatly concerned with investment
media for employment of their funds.
1/ Bankers Trust Company, New York, Outlook for Bank
Earnings, 1946-1948
.
p. 18

There will be a rise in the volame of commercial
paper outstanding and in banker's acceptances outstanding,
and these are very acceptable items for the secondary reserve
account. A moderate rise in the yield on these two assets
is indicated and will be developed more fully in the dis-
cussion of interest rates.
Call loans to brokers will stay at a figure of about
$1 billion. This will be due to the regulatory actions of
the Federal Reserve Board. The yield will be low and while
constituting a desirable item, call loans will not play an
important part in the secondary reserve account.
II. INTEREST RATES
The Importance of Interest Rates . At the present
time, the most perplexing problem to bankers and financiers
is the future of interest rates. By interest rates is here
meant the rates on commercial and industrial loans, call
loans, and banker's acceptances, as well as coupon rates on
security issues. Interest rates determine not only earnings,
but what the banker thinks concerning interest rate trends
will determine what assets he will include in the secondary
reserve account, and also in the bond investment account.
Recent History of Interest Rates
.
Money rates were
very low on all types of loans during the 1930s. This was a
result, chiefly, of the demand and supply factors, as the

banks had large excess reserves, due to the influx of gold.
There was little demand for bank funds from commercial
enterprises. Government competition, in the form of lending
agencies, was a contributing factor to the depressed money-
rate condition.
Interest rates on securities were also very low as
Government issues dominated the market, and the Government
succeeded in successfully controlling the interest rates on
its securities.
During the war, the increased demand for capital
funds on the part of expanding industry was handled by the
Government. As a result, commercial and industrial loans
of commercial banks actually decline. Money rates rose
very slightly.
The same condition held true in the securities market
where continued Government domination of this field kept
interest rates at a very low point.
The year 1946, saw a general firming of interest rates
This was due to the fact that the debt-retirement policy
of the Treasury, accompanied by a somewhat firmer open-market
policy on the part of the Federal Reserve System had the
effect of slightly tightening the reserve position of member
banks.
In April /r9467the Federal Reserve eliminated the
preferential discount rate of 1/2 per cent on short-
term Government securities, leaving the minimum borrowing
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rate at 1 per cent for member banks. As a result,
the rate on loans to brokers and dealers as well as
the rates on commercial paper and banker's acceptances
advanced to levels which brought them more in line
with this new minimum. 1/
In forecasting the future of interest rates, it is
best to consider, separately, (1) rates on loans (including
commercial and industrial loans, commercial paper, banker's
acceptances, and call loans) and, (2) interest rates on
securities*
1, The future will see a continued tendency for money
rates to harden, moderately, on loans. The factors bringing
2/
this about are:
a. Capital demands from business concerns. This
demand will be mitigated by the fact that most
large corporations will supply their own funds
through current earnings or finance themselves by
security issues.
b. Capital demands from foreign countries.
c. Continued business activity. This factor
underlies the two preceding ones, and is, naturally,
very important.
Interest Rates on Securities.
2. The discussion of the future of security interest
rates must be further sub-divided into (a) Government
1/ Bankers Trust Company, New York, United States G-overnment
Securities and the Money Market, p. 12.
2/ J. H. Riddle, "The Future of Interest Rates", The Bankers
Magazine. 166:228-229, March, 1943.
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securities, and (b) corporate securities*
Governaient Securities , (a)
There seems to be little doubt either as to the
intention or the ability of our monetary authorities to
maintain a low level of interest rates during 1947.
In his budget message of January 10, 1947, President
Truman stated, "Our debt management policy is designed
to hold interest rates at the present low level and to
prevent undue fluctuations in the bond market, , .The
Treasury and the Federal Reserve System will continue
their effective control of interest rates." 1/
Hence, the pattern of money rates on Government
obligations will remain unchanged, ranging from 7/S of Ifo
on certificates of indebtedness to 2 l/2fo on long-term
2/
Grovernments. (See Figure I)
Corporate Securities , (b) Interest rates on corporate
issues should rise because of the need for capital of indus-
trial concerns and municipalities, and the fact that the
tendency has been and, will be, to obtain capital through
investment media, rather than through bank borrowing. The
following remarks by Dr. Jules I. Bogen, before the Confer-
ence on Finance of the American Management Association on
February 5, 1947, are set forth at length because of their
pertinence to this problem:
1/ Bankers Trust Company, New York.
Cf: Marcus Nadler,"No Change in 2 1/2^ Long-Term Interest
Rate", The Commercial and Financial Chronicle
, 165:1002,
February 20, 1947.
2/ Marcus Nadler, "Trend in Short-Term Credit", The Commercial
and Financial Chronicle
, 164:2794, November 28, 1946,

FIfiUHE 1.
YIELDS ON GOV^HIMEi\T SECiiRITIES
1942 - 1946 (Sept.)

The cost to corporations of borrowing money is likely
to rise over the next few years, even if the interest rates
on Groverninent securities are effectively pegged at present
levels.
The huge size of the public debt makes it necessary
for the Federal Reserve banks and the Treasury to co-operate
closely to support the market for Government obligations
•
Pegged interest rates close to those prevailing
today may be expected.
Interest rates on corporate financing do not bear a
fixed relation to yields on Government securities of cor-
responding maturities. Kather, the differential between
yields on Governments and on corporate obligations varies in
response to four major influences. They are:
1. The volume of the available offerings of the two
classes of obligations. During the war, Treasury securities
were sold in great profusion, whereas corporate financing
was at a low ebb. This caused the yield spread to narrow to
a marked extent.
By contrast, the next few years could well witness
some contraction in the volume of Treasury securities held
outside Government agencies, while corporate financing could
expand considerably with a high level of business activity
and a high price level.
2. The value that investors place on a protected

market for Government securities, as against tJae relatively
free market for corporate obligations. Institutional
investors will doubtless place a higher value upon the
stabilized market for Governments in an era, when corporate
bond prices may pursue a declining trend, which would further
widen yield differentials,
3, The credit risk, minimized in an era of large
corporate profits is taken far more seriously when the
profits outlook becomes clouded. Doubts about future earn-
ings, as has been seen in the case of the airlines, makes
lenders more insistent upon adequate compensation for
assuming credit risks.
4. Operating costs of financial institutions are
rising. This puts pressure upon them to increase their
revenues to offset higher costs, as is the case with other
businesses. Since pegged interest rates on Government
securities prevent them from securing a higher return on
this part of their portfolio, except through lengthening
maturities, the pressure will be so much greater to obtain
higher yield from corporate obligations.
These factors will tend to raise the interest cost
of corporate financing, both short and long term, over the
next few years, even if yi§lds on Government securities of
various maturities are held unchanged through Federal Heserve
and Treasury action. Should interest rates on Government

securities be allowed to rise, the increase in corporate
interest rates may be expected to becorrespondingly greater.
Forces Affecting bank earnings . It is very difficult
to forecast bank earnings for tiie next few years.
Cominercial banks have had seven successive years of
rising current operating earnings. From 1938 to 1941,
the increase was 9 per cent; from 1941 to 1945 the
growth was 43 #5 per cent. 2j
However, during the 1939-1945 period, current operating
expenses increased by one-third. Increased operating
expenses seem certain, as high prices result in higher wageB,
office expenses, rental expense, etc.
Operating earnings appear to have reached their peak;
if anything, a tapering-off process will take place, in the
next few years.
It is important to note that bank income from U. S.
Government securities exceeded billion in 1945 for the
first time, even though the income from Government bonds
3/
only averaged about 1.69 per cent. This is indicative of
how much of commercial bank funds are employed in this low-
T7 Jules I. Bogen, "Foresees Higher Hates for Corporate
Loans," The Commercial and Financial Chronicle , 165: 875
>
February 13, 1947. Cf. jI. M. iiattlson, "Interest Hates May
Be Lower", The Commercial and Financial Chronicle
, 165:739,
February 6, 1947.
2/ Bankers Trust Co., New York, Outlook for Bank iiiarnings^
III. BAl^ EARNINGS
/ Bankers Trust Co., Ivew York, Outlook for Bank jj^arnings ,
946-1948
, p. 34.

yielding asset.
Indicated Trends , The tendency will certainly be
for banks to endeavour to place their funds in more lucrative
assets such as corporate securities and consumer installment
loans.
We anticipate that the commercial banks will maintain
an improved competitive position in the instalment-credit
field and will provide about 45 per cent of the total
outstanding instalment credit, I'his compares with less
than 30 per cent supplied by banks at the end of 1941
the previous peak year of instalment financing. In
recent years, commercial banks have become increasingly
aware of the profit possibilities, in the field of
instalment financing, and, have made elaborate prepara-
tions to complete activity for the business, , . The
percentage of total instaliuent credit provided by
insured banks was nearly 38 per cent at the close of 1945
and rose to about 43 per cent at the end of July, 1946,
Continued increase to the ratio of 45 per cent assumed
in our estimates seems a reasonable expectation.!/
Outlook for the secondary tteserve Account , The
outlook for the secondary reserve account is fairly good.
Not only has there been an increase in the volume of com-
mercial paper and banker's acceptances, outstanding, but the
yield on these assets has increased moderately and should
remain firm. Gall loans, while slumping from the all-time
1945 high of ^^^3 billion to a present figure of around igjl
billion, are still 30;^ greater in volume than they were in
1938. The rate on call loans has also hardened, and the
recent lowering of the margin requirements to 75"/o should
1/ ibid, p. 27.

encourage a persistent deraand for this type of loan*
The future of U. S. Government bills, certificates of
indebtedness, and notes is closely bound to future Treasury
policy. The Treasury has been following a policy of con-
verting into certificates all maturing or callable issues
1/
not redeemed in cash. Thus, the one to five-year Treasury
notes and bank-eligible bonds are diminishing in amount.
2/
As of September 30, 1946, commercial banks had approximately
68,7 per cent of their Government securities due or callable
within five years. (See Tables II and III)
Unless the Treasury policy changes, and bonds and
notes are issued, the commercial banks will be forced to
eventually seek other outlets for their secondary reserve
funds. The crux of the situation is that the Treasury much
prefers to issue the lower-yielding certificates of indebt-
edness rather than the higher-yielding notes and bonds.
One solution would be for the banks to acquire a
selection of municipal, state and corporate securities in
their bond investment account, widely diversified as to
maturity, which through the passage of time, could be
transferred to the secondary reserve account. The problem
XT Bankers Trust Company, New York, United estates Government
Securities and the x»Ioney Market
, p. 10.
Zj ibid. p. 8-7,355, Commercial banks and 34 stock savings
banks.

1/
TABLE II
TTfE OF UNITED STATES GOV-:JiNx.'iElN)T I^SSUE HELD BY
COi#'lERCIAL BANKS, 1945 - 1946
(Aiaounts in billions of dollars)
Type of Issue Held Dec. 31, Sept. 30, Per Cent
by Comfliercial Banks 1945(a) 1946(b) Change Change(c)
Treasury bills 2.5 0.9 -1.5 -60%
Certificate of
indebtedness 18.1 14.5 -3.6
Treasury notes 15.7 8.7 -7.0 -44/o
Treasury bonds 46.5 48.2 /1.
7
/ 4^
Total 82.8 72.4 -10.4
(a) 7>382 Commercial banks and 34 stock savings banks.
(b) 7,355 Commercial banks and 34 stock savings banks.
(c) This column added by the author of this thesis, and the
figures therein have been rounded off to the nearest
whole number.
1/ jBankers rrust Company, i\iew York, united States Government
Securities and the .vloney xklarket
, p. 7.

TABLE III
imTCrRITY DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED STATES GOVERNIOTT
1/
SECURITIES HiiLD BY TEE COi^tlERCIAL BANKS, 1945-1946
(Amounts in billions of dollars)
December 31. 1945(a) SeDtember 30, 1946(b)
Due or Callable Amount
Per Cent
01 Total Amount
Per Cent
01 Total
Within 1 year 30.5 36.8 21.4 29.6
1 to 5 years 25.2 30.4 28.3 39.1
5 to 10 years 21.0 25.4 17.6 24.3
10 to 15 years 3.6 4.3 2.2 3.0
15 to 20 years 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3
Over 20 years 2.4 2.9 2.6 3.6
Total 82.8 100.0 72.4 100.0
(a) 7,382 Commercial banks and 34 stock: savings banks.
(b) 7,355 Commercial banks and 34 stock savings banks.
1/ Bankers Trust Company, New York, United States Government
Securities and the Money Market
, p. 8.

Ihere is that, even with the most careful planning of laaturities,
forced liquidation of securities at an unfavorable price,
might be necessitated because of deposit demands.
A very interesting thought, concerning the secondary
reserve account, is offered by i^, Vifoodlief Thomas, Assistant
Director-Division of Research and Statistics for the Federal
Reserve System:
The fact of deposit insurance should remove one of
the dangers /forced licuidation of securities/^g^i^ist
which banks had to safeguard themselves in the past,
and make it possible for them to place less emphasis
upon short maturities and ready marketability and more 1/
emphasis upon inherent soundness of loans and investments.
Outlook for the Bond Investment Account . The bond
investment account should see a trend toward corporate state
and municipal issues. There are two reasons for this:
1. The seeming intention of the Treasury not to issue
any more long-term bonds.
2. The attractiveness of corporate state and municipal
issues.
There is developing a broadening demand for tax-
exempt securities, especially from commercial banks,
not only because of the attractive yields with which
new issues have been baited but because of the impact
on investment portfolios of the retirement of public
debt and of the shortening—through the passage of time
—
of the maturities of outstanding Government obligations,
with no likelihood of replenishment in kind. 2/
1/ V/oodlief Thomas, "The Banks and Idle Money", Federal
Reserve Bulletin
, 26:195, March, 1940.
2/ Paul Heffernan, "Municipal Bonds Facing Transition",
The New York Times
,
96:F1, February 23, 1947.

CHAPTER VII*
SUiya'IARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Introduction , The preceding chapter has presented
conclusions concerning the outlook for interest rates, for
bank: earnings and for the assets comprising the secondary
reserve and bond investment account , respectively • There
remains the task: of emphasizing, in summary fashion, the
present situation which confronts the commercial banker,
with regard to the assets of his secondary reserve and bond
investment accounts.
Increased Costs of Operation . The banker today is
caught between the millstones of increased costs of opera-
tions and the Government's fiscal operations with the conse-
1/
quent depressing influences on interest rates. The rising
trend of operating costs is very likely to continue,
especially on such items as wages and salaries, etc. In 1945,
"other current operation expenses", consisting principally
of salaries and wages, expenses of occupancy and maintenance
of banking o^uarters, legal and other services, advertising
and miscellaneous office expenses such as stationery,
printing, postage, telephone and telegraph, increased by
|107 million, or over 10 per cent. Further substantial
1/ George A. Mooney, "Decline Indicated in Bank Earnings"./
The Hew York Times
,
96:F1, March 30, 1947.
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increases are anticipated for 1946-1948, in line with a
fairly high average level of prices and the increased volume
1/
of bank activity.
Future Government Fiscal Policy . The banker cannot
expect, at least in the immediate future, that the Treasury
bill rate and the certificate rate will be "unpegged".
Raising the current rate of 3/8 of T/o on Treasury bills,
would have a tremendous psychological effect in making
possible somewhat higher corollary rates on loans in the
short-term credit market.
The Commercial Banker *s Problem . Thus, stationed
between the pincers of increasing operating costs and
artificially low-interest rates, the commercial banker must
look hopefully to a continued large volume of commercial and
industrial loans. Even though such loans may continue at
their present volume for another year or so, a new risk
factor has entered in connection with granting such loans.
Until recently, the banks have been inclined to indulge in
highly competitive activities often neglecting to make
sufficient distinction between the riskless paper of the
Treasury and the less certain promises of private borrowers-
borrowers now completely on their own responsibility and
1/ Economics Department, Bankers Trust Company, New York,
Outlook for Bank Earnings, 1946-1948
, pp. 41-42.

without the guarantee of a Govermnent war supply contract.
Now, adding to the potential difficulties is the recognition
that despite the apparent desirability of the current high
volume of private business loans, a risk factor is attached
which is likely to become more real as losses develop with
the passage of time. Thus, the immediate problem of main-
taining earnings at a sufficiently adequate rate is further
emphasized.
In conclusion, the unequivocal statement can be made
that the present-day comimercial banker faces a problem that
will test his banking ability to the utmost. His is a three-
fold tasJc:
1. To keep operating expenses at a minimum.
2. To employ the maximum of investment skill in order
to keep the secondary reserve and bond investment accounts
sufficiently liquid, and yet to maintain investment earnings
at a maximum, commensurate with safety.
3. To maintain commercial and industrial loan volume
at a high level, while at the same time seeking new loan
business (such as personal installment loans) in anticipation
of a probable decline in the volume of commercial and
industrial loans.
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AN ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Introduction . This thesis is a study of the
secondary reserve and bond investment accounts of United
States commercial banks during the 1929-1946 period. Three
questions are proposed and answered;
1. What actually were the component parts of com-
mercial banJcs' secondary reserve and bond investment accounts
during the period under consideration?
2. What were the reasons why these accounts were so
constituted?
3. What does the future hold for commercial banks
with regard to their secondary reserve accounts and bond
investment accounts, respectively?
Summary * A bank has three reserve accounts, the
primary reserve, the secondary reserve, and the bond invest-
ment account. By "reserve" account is meant a reserve
against the withdrawal and other fluctuations of demand
deposits. The three reserve accounts are closely inter-
connected, and any appreciable change in one will affect the
others.
I'he primary reserve consists of cash in the bank's
vault, balance with the Federal Reserve Bank, and deposits
maintained with correspondent banks. The primary reserve is
the first line of defense against deposit withdrawals.
-69-
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Liquidity is its all-important characteristic.
The secondary reserve consists of call loans, com-
mercial paper, bankers' acceptances, United titates certifi-
cates, Treasury bills, Treasury notes, and bonds (United
States, corporate, state, and municipal) maturing within
four years. The secondary reserve is used to replenish the
primary reserve, when this is deemed necessary. Three
characteristics should be found in this account. In order
they are, safety, liquidity,, and yield.
The bond investment account consists of those United
States, corporate, state and municipal bonds having matur-
ities in excess of four years. This account is further
removed from the fluctuations of deposits than the secondary
|
reserve, iience, although safety is still paramount in
|
choosing bonds for inclusion within this account, yield comes
,
next., before liquidity. The banker does not expect to be
forced to sell his bonds in a hurry, possibly at a loss.
The outstanding change in commercial banking practice
since 1929 until the present time, has been the shift from j
traditional loan and discount functions to investment functions.
In other words, comiiiercial banks have invested their reserve
funds in securities (especially Government securities)
rather than using these funds for granting comaiercial and
industrial loans. The secondary reserve has been composed of

U. S. Government short-term securities, while the bond
account has been dominated by medium-term and long-term
Governments.
This change in banking practice was not desired by
the bankers, but was forced upon them by economic and polit-
ical forces. The bankers* dislike of investment media
centers around the problem of earnings, as investment media
returned a low yield during the 1929-1946 era, much lower
than would have resulted had the banker been able to grant
commercial and industrial loans.
ifoT a better understanding of the forces underlying
the forced shift of commercial banks to investment media, it
is best to divide the 1929-1946 period into three sections,
namely, 1929-1939, 1940-1945, and the post-war period.
1929-1939
The economic forces affecting commercial banks were:
1. Business depression, and the resultant lessening
of demand for commercial and industrial loans.
2. detention of funds by corporations. This trend
had started in the 1920s, as corporations tended to finance
themselves by re-investing earnings, or by issuing their
own securities. The need of bank credit was obviated.
3. Influx of gold. The influx of gold increased
excess bank reserves. It gave the banks large amounts of

funds to employ, with no place to employ them except in
investment media, especially Government securities. Also,
and most important by acting on the supply side of bank
credit, it induced lower money rates,
4. Bank earnings, learnings fell drastically, as the
commercial banker's chief source of revenue, commercial and
industrial loans, diminished sharply as a revenue-producing
source. The banker turned to the low-yielding Government
issues, hoping to bolster earnings by the volume of his
security holdings, despite the low return,
5. Government bonds. U, S. Government obligations
dominated the security market, so not only was the com-
mercial banker forced to turn to investment media, but,
more specifically, to Government issues.
The political forces during the 1929-1939 period
operated on the side of lower interest rates. Thus, any
tendency for interest rates to rise in accordance with the
normal functioning of the prevalent demand and supply fac-
tors was thwarted by:
1, Government lending agencies, which competed v/ith
the banks, and because of subsidation were able to maintain
low interest rates,
2, Government attitude on interest rates. The
Federal fieserve System, co-operating with the Treasury
Department effectively pegged short-term interest rates at

3/8^ for bills and 7/8/0 for certificates of indebtedness.
!
This was accoraplished by the Federal Reserve supporting the
I
market for these securities at the stated prices.
1940-1945
The war period saw an aggravation of the trend
toward conuiercial bank ownership of Government securities.
Both for patriotic reasons and as a means of bolstering
earnings in the absence of other available earning outlets,
the banks bought huge quantities of Government issues. The
commercial banks financed the war, as the Government went
more deeply into debt to the banks. Large Treasury war loan
deposits were created on the books of banks and these
inflated, excess funds were used to purchase more and more
Government securities, as the Government creditors received
payment from the war loan deposits, and then proceeded to
buy more Government bonds.
Bank earnings improved markedly during the war, as
most banks made profits on the securities they held. i:iVen
though the return per individual Government security held
was low, yet the volume of Government securities held was so
large that good profits were inevitable. :«ioreover, security
profits were made by selling previously purchased Government
obligations as the market prices of Government obligations
rose.

Post-V/ar i-eriod
This period has been marked chiefly by the Treasury
debt-retirexflent program. There was a net reduction of ^^IB
billion in the i^ederal debt during 1946, This reduction was
effected with surplus funds from the last war loan drive.
Commercial bank holdings of Government obligations dropped,
especially holdings of short-term issues.
However, the Treasury cash balance is now down to
approximately ^3 billion, and any future reduction of the
bank-held debt seems unlikely. Thus, a permanent national
debt of at least $200 billion remains, and the commercial
banks will continue to hold a substantial portion of it.
At the present time, the commercial banks are left with
around ^75 billion of Governinent securities in their
secondary reserve and bond investment accounts, combined.
Conclusions . Finally, there remains a consideration
of the future of the secondary reserve and bond investment
accounts. These two accounts will be affected, as before,
by economic and political happenings:
Economic
1. Although business activity has boomed tremendously
since the end of the war, with a resulting increase in the
volume of commercial and industrial loans, it should be
realized that corporations will continue to finance them-
selves, as much as possible. The corporate financing will

75
take the form of re- investment of earnings and security
issues. Corporate security issues have greatly increased in
volume, recently, liany of the current commercial and
industrial loans granted by banks to corporations are temporary'
being used solely to carry inventories at present high prices.
Thus, permanent changes in comiuercial banking prac-
tice have taken place and commercial banks v/ill of necessity,
|
remain, to a large extent, in the investment field.
2. The trend of commercial banks toward consumer
installment loans and long-term loans (over one year) will
continue, as banks seek lucrative earning outlets for funds.
Political
1. The Government, supported by the Federal Heserve
will keep interest rates pegged on Government obligations.
However, demand and supply factors will come into play on
corporate and municipal issues, and the interest rate will
increase here, as corporations expand by issuing their own
securities.
2. Commercial banks will continue to hold a large
part of the Government debt, in the form of Government
obligations. It is possible that any attempt of the com-
mercial banks to unload a substantial portion of their
Government securities in favor of higher-yielding corporate
and municipal issues, would result in legislation requiring
each commercial bank to hold a certain amount of these

Grovernment obligations.
Bank earnings will decline from war-time levels, and
the banker will have to exercise excellent judgement in
placing bank funds in earning assets. The rate of charge-off
on commercial and industrial loans will rise rather than
decrease. The chance for profits on the sale of Government
securities will be negligible, and operating expenses will
maintain their present high level.
The endeavour to bolster bank earnings will affect the
secondary reserve and bond investment accounts. The secondary
reserve will still be dominated by G-overnment obligations
because of their safety and liquidity. However, holdings of
commercial paper should increase to some extent and maturing
corporate state and municipal issues will be held in the
secondary reserve.
The bond investment account should shov«/ a more marked
change. The largest volume of new securities will be in
state and municipal bonds, but there will also be a good
proportion of corporate bonds, including equipment trust
certificates. Commercial banks will invest in these issues,
thus supplementing Government obligations. This trend will
be aided by the evident Government policy of not issuing any
more long-term bonds. The secondary reserve will also gradu-
ally shift away, somewhat, from even the short-term Government
issues, as the corporate and municipal issues are shifted to
jyig. ^secojijiiary: jeserve ^ due—lio--thfiir- approachang^ maturity datjB*=
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